How Brazil Compares to the Rest of the World in the Regulation of Digital Platforms

Digital platforms have, for some time, occupied a central position in competition law debates in Brazil and across numerous jurisdictions, most notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. 

Brazil has intensified its scrutiny of major technology companies, both through decisions issued by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and through legislative initiatives aimed at regulating digital platforms, such as Bill No. 4,675/2025 (the “Bill”). As discussed in a previous article, the Bill seeks to equip CADE with enhanced institutional capacity and additional tools to address competition issues arising in digital platform markets. 

On the enforcement front, CADE has accelerated its investigations into the conduct of large technology companies. In relation to Apple, the authority initially imposed interim measures designed to curb restrictions on access to the iOS ecosystem and the imposition of allegedly excessive fees on app developers and vendors. Ultimately, the matter was resolved through a negotiated settlement under which Apple undertook to modify certain aspects of its conduct. 

CADE has also taken significant action with respect to Google. The authority ordered the reassessment of a previously dismissed case, launched a new investigation, and entered into a Cease-and-Desist Commitment Agreement (Termo de Compromisso de Cessação, or TCC) in proceedings originally initiated in 2019 following a European Commission decision concerning anticompetitive practices linked to the Android operating system. 

A common feature of both the Apple and Google matters is the growing prominence of negotiated resolutions in digital market cases before CADE. Settlements may likewise provide a pathway to resolving ongoing investigations involving: (i) Meta, including proceedings examining whether the company engaged in practices that prevented artificial intelligence tool providers from accessing and offering their technologies to WhatsApp users, a matter in which interim measures were also adopted; and (ii) Microsoft, in relation to investigations into the potentially anticompetitive effects of its software licensing policies. According to the reporting commissioner in the Google case, negotiated resolutions promote legal certainty and help avoid protracted litigation. 

Converging Concerns, Divergent Approaches 

These developments mirror broader international trends. Competition authorities around the world have examined many of the same practices under scrutiny by CADE, albeit often reaching different outcomes and imposing distinct remedies. 

The European Commission concluded that Google had limited consumer choice by effectively steering users toward Google Search through its pre-installation on Android devices. 

To achieve this, Google provided financial incentives to device manufacturers, including Samsung, to pre-install Google Search as the default search engine and to refrain from distributing devices running modified versions of Android.  

The Commission found that users seldom changed their default search engines and that such exclusivity arrangements reduced exposure to competing services. In the United States, courts similarly identified anticompetitive effects arising from agreements that linked payments or licensing terms to the preferential distribution of Google services. India likewise imposed remedies targeting the pre-installation and preferential placement of Google’s services within the Android ecosystem. 

Both CADE and the European Commission identified concerns regarding Google’s tying of services to the Play Store and exclusivity arrangements involving the pre-installation of applications. The European decision, however, was more far-reaching, prohibiting Google from enforcing Anti-Fragmentation Agreements whereby manufacturers undertook not to launch devices based on modified Android “forks.” Google had required such commitments as a condition for access to the Play Store and its proprietary applications. 

The agreement reached with CADE does not contain a comparable prohibition. According to the Brazilian authority, compatibility requirements may serve a legitimate purpose in preserving technical standards across devices operating within the Android and Play Store ecosystem. Another distinguishing feature of the Brazilian settlement is its focus on services of particular significance to the domestic market, namely the Play Store, Google Search, and Chrome. 

Apple’s app distribution and payment policies have likewise attracted regulatory scrutiny, although the scope and legal basis of the resulting obligations vary considerably across jurisdictions. In the European Union, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) introduced far-reaching obligations requiring Apple to permit alternative channels for app distribution and payment processing. 

 In the United States, litigation has focused primarily on restrictions preventing developers from directing users toward external purchasing options, commonly referred to as anti-steering provisions. South Korea concentrated on Apple’s exclusive payment system requirements, while Japan adopted a broader framework through the Mobile Software Competition Act, mandating greater openness in app distribution and payment mechanisms. 

A Comparative Perspective  

The interim measures imposed on Apple, together with the settlements concluded with both Apple and Google, suggest that Brazil’s approach to applying competition law in digital platform markets has evolved broadly in parallel with developments in other leading jurisdictions. 

Although the competitive concerns identified by CADE closely resemble those examined in Europe and the United States, the Brazilian authority has generally opted for a more cautious and pragmatic approach, favouring negotiated settlements over formal infringement decisions. This posture may, at least in part, reflect the absence of a dedicated legislative framework governing digital platforms in Brazil. 

Nevertheless, several ongoing investigations could ultimately lead to the imposition of sanctions on digital platforms, including the proceedings involving Meta and Microsoft discussed above. In parallel, a number of legislative proposals currently under consideration seek to regulate digital platforms, particularly from a competition law perspective. 

CADE’s enforcement activities in relation to major digital platforms are therefore poised to play a pivotal role in shaping the structure and governance of Brazil’s digital markets in the years ahead.