The Regulation of Digital Platforms: Reflections on Bill No. 4,675/2025

The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies has recently approved an expedited legislative procedure for Bill No. 4,675/2025 (the “Bill”), which seeks to establish a regulatory framework for digital platforms. As a result, the proposal may now be considered directly by the plenary, without prior review by the relevant parliamentary committees, significantly accelerating its legislative progress and underscoring the importance of the ongoing debate regarding the proposed regulatory model. 

The Brazilian chamber of deputies has recently approved an expedited legislative procedure for bill as a result, the proposal may now be considered directly by the plenary.

The Bill aims to introduce a sector-specific competition regime for digital platforms. It is premised on the view that Brazil's existing antitrust framework, embodied in Law No. 12,529/2011, may be insufficient to address the challenges arising in digital markets. Accordingly, the proposal seeks to equip the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) with preventive regulatory tools designed to mitigate competition-related risks. 

The proposed regime would apply to economic agents deemed to possess “systemic relevance in digital markets,” drawing inspiration from international initiatives such as the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the United Kingdom’s emerging regulatory framework for digital markets. 

The proposal is grounded in the recognition that certain digital market participants may occupy pivotal positions within complex ecosystems, benefit from strong network effects, and exert substantial influence over competitive conditions. To address these concerns, the Bill establishes a regulatory procedure through which agents may be designated as possessing systemic relevance. 

In parallel, it creates a separate process for determining the specific obligations to be imposed upon designated entities, with the objective of preventing potential competitive harm. Neither proceeding is punitive in nature; rather, both are intended to define the particular regulatory regime applicable to each designated undertaking. 

This approach departs from the traditional logic of competition law enforcement. Under conventional antitrust rules, conduct is generally not prohibited in advance; instead, its legality is assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account its actual effects on the relevant market. By contrast, the Bill proposes an ex ante regulatory regime under which the authority would be empowered to identify, in advance, conduct that is either prohibited or mandatory for designated firms, based on a presumption of anticompetitive effects rather than on demonstrated harm. 

One of the principal concerns surrounding the proposed framework relates to the criteria for designating systemic actors. The Bill adopts a broad set of qualitative criteria, applicable on a non-cumulative basis and within a non-exhaustive framework, combined with relatively modest global and domestic revenue thresholds.  

As currently drafted, these provisions appear excessively expansive and may capture firms with only limited competitive significance in Brazil. Such an approach not only increases administrative discretion but may also lead to the inefficient allocation of CADE’s institutional resources, diverting attention from market participants that present genuinely significant competitive risks. 

The adoption of objective criteria tailored to the Brazilian market would likely enhance the focus and effectiveness of the regime while bringing it into closer alignment with its stated objectives and with international best practices.  

Rather than relying on broad qualitative factors, the legislation could incorporate cumulative and readily verifiable benchmarks, such as substantial domestic revenues derived from digital services, a significant number of Brazilian users, and meaningful market shares. 

With respect to the imposition of specific obligations, the Bill authorizes CADE to impose tailored requirements following an individualized assessment of the circumstances in which each designated undertaking operates. This feature has the advantage of avoiding one-size-fits-all solutions that may prove disproportionate in practice. However, the list of potential obligations remains largely abstract and broadly framed, which may complicate their practical application, supervision, and compliance. 

In this regard, the inclusion of concrete examples and clearer parameters, whether within the legislation itself or through subsequent regulatory guidance, would contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the regime. Illustrative circumstances justifying access obligations, interoperability requirements, transparency measures, or merger notification duties would help reduce legal uncertainty.  

Furthermore, any obligations imposed should be grounded in a robust regulatory impact assessment supported by empirical evidence, case-specific analysis, and economic studies demonstrating a plausible risk to competition. 

Another particularly sensitive aspect concerns the initiation of designation proceedings and obligation-setting procedures, which may be triggered not only by the authority itself but also by interested third parties and a variety of public bodies. Although mechanisms for stakeholder participation may enhance the legitimacy of regulatory processes, they may also create opportunities for strategic use by private actors. Such a dynamic could reduce legal predictability and place additional administrative burdens on the authority. Comparative experience suggests that more centralized systems, operating under stronger supervision by the competition authority, tend to produce more consistent and coherent outcomes. 

In conclusion, the Bill presents a valuable opportunity to reconsider and modernize Brazil’s competition policy framework in response to the challenges posed by the digital economy. To achieve this objective effectively, however, further refinement of the legislative text will be essential. 

This article was originally published in Valor Econômico on 8 May 2026. 

Alexandre Ditzel Faraco, Mariana Tavares de Araujo, and Marjorie Afonso are, respectively, partners and an associate at Levy & Salomão Advogados.